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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER ADARAND
N. Thompson Powers*
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION in Adarand' was a wake up call
for those who believed that the opinions on affirmative action that Jus-
tice Brennan wrote for the Court in Weber,2 Johnson,3 and Metro
Broadcasting' would survive his retirement.
Adarand explicitly overruled Metro Broadcasting in holding that
remedial racial set asides adopted by federal procurement agencies are
as subject to strict scrutiny as are white supremacy laws enacted by
state legislatures. This decision also has meaning for non-set aside pro-
grams such as the employment goals and timetables program imposed
on federal contractors under Executive Order 11246.
However, since Adarand involves the application of the equal pro-
tection component of the Fifth Amendment to governmental action, its
holding does not directly limit Weber and Johnson which deal with the
lawfulness under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of voluntary
affirmative action undertaken by employers.5
Nevertheless, the division of the Court in Adarand may well be
indicative of how the Court will split in affirmative action cases arising
under federal statutes as well as under the Constitution. Certainly that
division makes it unlikely that a majority of the present Court can be
obtained in support of voluntary or mandated affirmative action that
does not include Justice O'Connor, the author of the Court's opinion in
Adarand. It is, of course, possible that Justice Kennedy might provide
the fifth vote needed, but he has tended to align himself with Justice
O'Connor on affirmative action issues6 and has been somewhat more
conservative than she on these and related EEO issues.7
* N. Thompson Powers is the Senior Labor Counsel and Manager of the Labor and Employ-
ment Law Section of the Law Department of Motorola, Inc. in Phoenix, Arizona.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
3 Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
' Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
1 But see discussion infra at page 258 for Justice O'Connor's view that the standard for
judging the lawfulness of affirmative action by public employers is the same under Title VII as it
is under the equal protection clause.
I Justice Kennedy joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at
602, and he agreed with most of her opinion for the Court in Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,
518 (1989).
' See Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Croson, 488 U.S. at 518, and his dissent in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989).
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In deciding what this means for affirmative action, three questions
need to be answered:
1. What is the difference between the scope of lawful affirma-
tive action as set forth by Justice Brennan in Johnson and the more
limited scope that Justice O'Connor indicated she supported in her
concurrence in that case?
2. Is it likely that Justice O'Connor will now accept Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court in Johnson because of stare decisis,
even though she disagreed with it in her concurrence?
3. Are there any other significant differences between the opin-
ions of Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor on affirmative action
issues and how are they likely to be resolved?
I. THE BRENNAN/O'CONNOR OPINIONS IN JOHNSON
Justice Brennan's opinion in Johnson reaffirmed the Court's deci-
sion in Weber that race conscious action could be taken to "eliminate
manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories"
as long as such action did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of
the white employees." 8 Johnson not only repudiated the contention that
race conscious action is only lawful when it benefits identifiable victims
of discrimination, but it also upheld such action for the benefit of
women as well as for minorities.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in Johnson, but she
criticized the "expansive and ill defined approach to affirmative action
by public employers"' in Justice Brennan's opinion, and she set forth
her own more limited view of the circumstances under which voluntary
affirmative action was lawful under Title VII and the equal protection
clause.
Justice O'Connor declared that under either the statute or the
Constitution, a public employer wanting to take voluntary affirmative
action to increase its utilization of minorities "must have . . . a firm
basis for believing that remedial action was required."' 0 She went on to
say, as she had in her concurring opinion in Wygant," that evidence of
societal discrimination was not sufficient to justify an employer's con-
sidering race in making employment decisions. Instead in her view,
such a "firm basis" would exist if the employer could "point to a statis-
tical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie claim under Title VII
by the employee beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan of a pattern
or practice claim of discrimination. "12
' 480 U.S. at 628-30.
o Id. at 648.
10 Id. at 649.
a' Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 at 288 (1986).
480 U.S. at 649.
[Vol. 22:255 1996
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Justice O'Connor made clear that she would not require employers
to prove that they were currently discriminating or even that they had
discriminated in the past. She recognized that such requirements
"would discourage voluntary efforts to remedy apparent
discrimination."' 3
She would, however, insist that an employer justifying affirmative
action point to statistical evidence relevant to the jobs at issue. As she
explained in Johnson "only a goal that takes into account the number
of women and minorities qualified for the relevant position could satisfy
the requirement that an affirmative action plan be remedial. 1
4
A close reading of the Brennan/O'Connor opinions in Johnson,
leaves at least this reader unsure how much more specific statistical
evidence Justice O'Connor would require to justify affirmative action
than Justice Brennan would have done. Also, while Justice O'Connor
would require evidence (but not conclusive proof) of discrimination by
the employer taking the affirmative action, it is not clear from Justice
O'Connor's own analysis where she finds such evidence in Weber
against the employer and the union whose affirmative action plan was
being challenged. In practice, her requirement of a prima facie case
may require no more involvement by employers in past discrimination
than their hiring qualified white men who received training or experi-
ence that others denied to minorities and women.
As such this may be close to the "arguable violation" standard
that Kaiser Aluminum argued for in the Weber case and that Justice
Blackmun indicated he would have preferred. 15 If so, it should not be a
significant deterrent to employers considering affirmative action.
There is one further concern about Justice O'Connor's prima facie
standard and that is whether it would prevent employers from continu-
ing affirmative action when they have not yet reached parity, but where
their hiring or promotions during all of the current limitations period
has been at or above the availability of minorities and women. As one
who favors continued affirmative action in such cases I suggest that
Justice O'Connor's opinion focuses on the need to ensure that affirma-
tive action is "remedial." ' While she finds a "firm basis" for such ac-
tion where a prima facie case exists, such a basis may also be found
where a "manifest statistical imbalance in traditionally segregated job
classification" is no longer being perpetuated, but has only partially
been corrected.
Nevertheless, one should not assume that Justice O'Connor will
necessarily support consideration of race or sex goals until full parity is
achieved. She has repeatedly observed that "it is completely unrealistic
13 Id. at 652.
, Id. at 654.
1' 443 U.S. at 212.
10 See supra note 8 at 649.
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to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with mathemati-
cal exactitude to each employer or union absent unlawful discrimina-
tion."'1 7 Since she also believes that "[e]ven ... flexible goals ... may
trammel unnecessarily the rights of non minorities,"' 8 she may not find
sufficient justification for continuing race and sex-conscious hiring or
promotions once minorities or women are employed at sixty-five to
eighty percent of their percentage of the relevant labor pool.
Also problematic may be Justice O'Connor's belief that the same
standards should apply to judging the lawfulness of affirmative action
under Title VII and under the equal protection clause. While she made
this statement in her concurring opinion in Johnson, where the defend-
ant was a public employer, 9 there is no basis for imposing a different
standard of justification for affirmative action by private employers
under Title VII than is imposed on public employers by that same
statute.
Accordingly, under Justice O'Connor's approach private employers
may need to give more attention than many have to date to the "nar-
row tailoring" of their affirmative action plans and specifically to a
search for less race and sex-conscious plans which might be effective in
correcting work force imbalance.
II. STARE DEcIsIs
Justice O'Connor was unwilling to follow Metro Broadcasting in
Adarand for two principal reasons: first, because she does not consider
that adherence to precedent is rigidly required in constitutional cases,20
and secondly because she considered that stare decisis is better served
by following the earlier "intrinsically sounder" interpretations of the
Equal Protection clause from which Metro Broadcasting departed than
by following the more recent decision.2'
Cases involving the precedential effect of Weber and Johnson will
involve statutory, not constitutional issues, so stare decisis may be a
more substantial consideration to Justice O'Connor in such cases than
it was in Adarand. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor did not approach
Weber in the Johnson case with quite the deference that Justice Ste-
vens did.22
Accordingly, when another opportunity to revisit that subject is
before the Court, it seems unlikely that Justice O'Connor will consider
herself bound to follow Justice Brennan's opinion in Johnson and to
17 Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421 at 494; Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 at 197; Johnson, 480
U.S. 616 at 654.
18 Sheet Metal Workers, 480 U.S. 421 at 197.
19 Id.
20 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1986).
21 Id. Citing Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
" Compare 480 U.S. at 642-47 with id. at 647-57.
[Vol. 22:255 1996
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suppress the views she set forth in her own concurring opinion in that
case.
Therefore the differences in the Brennan/O'Connor opinions de-
scribed above may well become relevant and significant.
III. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
Justice O'Connor has also expressed her disagreement with Justice
Brennan on one other issue involving voluntary affirmative action and
on two issues involving Court-imposed affirmative action.
The issue in regard to voluntary affirmative action is who has the
burden of proof when a plan is challenged. In Johnson Justice Brennan
stated that the burden was on the challenger,23 and Justice O'Connor
did not disagree with him. 4
However, Justice O'Connor changed her opinion when the Court
in the Price Waterhouse case 5 held that once a plaintiff proves that an
illegitimate factor was considered in an employment decision, the bur-
den then shifts to the employer to prove that the same decision would
have been made even if there had been no discrimination. In his plural-
ity opinion in Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan sought to exclude
"the special context of affirmative action, 26 from being affected by
that decision. Justice O'Connor who concurred in the judgment,
agreed, however, with Justice Kennedy's dissent that the decision to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant when discrimination is a
substantial motivating factor is as applicable to the defense of an af-
firmative action plan as it is to the defense of any other charge of in-
tentional discrimination.27
The two issues of Court-imposed affirmative action on which Jus-
tice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Brennan concerned the lawfulness
under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment of quota-like orders
imposed on recalcitrant defendants. In the Sheet Metal Workers
case,28 the trial court had imposed a minority membership goal that the
union was to reach by a certain date or heavy fines would be imposed
on it. The union was also required to establish a fund to provide bene-
fits for minority apprentices, but not for non-minority apprentices.
Justice Brennan and the plurality for which he wrote considered
these orders reasonable under the circumstances and not in violation of
the anti-quota provision of Title VII: Section 703(). They interpreted
23 Id. at 626-27.
24 Id. 647-57. In her concurring opinion in Wygant, Justice O'Connor had stated that the
challenger had the burden of proof in claiming that an affirmative action plan violated the equal
protection clause. 476 U.S. 267 at 292-93.
25 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
26 Id. at 239 n.3.
27 Id. at 279, citing 490 U.S., at 293 n. 4.
11 Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
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that section as not limiting the remedial powers of courts, but only as
protecting employers and unions from being found in violation of the
statute simply because of a racial imbalance in their work force or
membership.
While Justice O'Connor concurred in part of the Court's judgment
in the Sheet Metal Workers case,2 9 she dissented insofar as the judg-
ment upheld the membership goal and the fund order. She considered
that these orders operated "not as goals but as racial quotas which run
counter to §703(j)... and are thus impermissible under §706(g)."30
In her opinion, "racial quotas are impermissible as a means of en-
forcing Title VII, and. .. even racial preferences short of quotas should
be used only where clearly necessary if these preferences would benefit
non-victims at the expense of innocent non-minority workers."31
Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Brennan's plurality opinion for
offering "little guidance as to what separates an impermissible quota
from a permissible goal." 2 She found more help in a 1973 memoran-
dum adopted by EEOC and the Departments of Labor and Justice
which stated that a goal is "a numerical objective, fixed realistically in
terms of the number of vacancies expected and the number of qualified
applicants available in the relevant job market" and that "an em-
ployer's failure to meet a goal despite good faith effort 'is not subject to
sanction because [the employer] is not expected to displace existing
employees or to hire unneeded employees to meet [the] goal.' 33
Despite the union's "egregious" violations of Title VII and its
sometimes "inexcusable recalcitrance" in responding to earlier orders
of the District Court, 4 Justice O'Connor refused to support the mem-
bership goal because it required the union's membership to mirror the
relevant labor pool by a specific date "without regard to variables such
as the numbers of qualified minority applicants available or the number
of new apprentices needed" and because the union and its joint appren-
ticeship committee faced fines that "will threaten their very existence"
if this goal was not attained. 35
Paradise presented a similar situation where a one black to one
white goal had been imposed on the promotion of highway troopers by
the Alabama Department of Public Safety. This goal, which was chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, was upheld by the Supreme Court, and Justice Brennan again
29 Id. at 489.
30 Id. at 490.
31 Id. at 493.
32 Id. at 494.
33 Id. at 496.
3 Id. at 497.
" Id. at 497.
"6 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
[Vol. 22:255 1996
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announced the judgment of the Court and presented an opinion for a
plurality of the justices.
Justice O'Connor neither joined in that opinion nor concurred in
the Court's judgment. She acknowledged the "pervasive, systematic
and obstinate discriminatory conduct" of the Alabama department,3 7
but noted that the District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy
that was narrowly tailored to end that department's "egregious history
of discrimination." 38 Because she considered that the Court was adopt-
ing a "standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far less stringent than
that required by strict scrutiny," Justice O'Connor dissented.39
In her dissenting opinion Justice O'Connor set forth the reasons
why she believed that the one-for-one promotional goal was not as nar-
rowly tailored as it should have been. One of these was the fact that
the one-for-one goal far exceeded the percentage of blacks in the
trooper force.40 While conceding that "the percentage of minority indi-
viduals benefitted by a racial goal may . .. exceed the percentage of
minority group members in the relevant work force, '41 Justice
O'Connor declared that "protection of the rights of non-minority work-
ers demands that a racial goal not substantially exceed the percentage
of minority group members in the relevant... work force absent com-
pelling justification. 42
Justice O'Connor did not find such a compelling justification in
this case. Moreover, she concluded that the District Court had imposed
its one-for-one goal without considering whether there was any alterna-
tive means of forcing the Alabama department to develop a promo-
tional process that did not have an adverse impact on black troopers.
Because of this and the fact that she found at least two alternatives
that would have a lesser effect on the rights of non-minority troopers,
appointment of a trustee to develop the desired procedure and stiff fines
or other penalties for contempt, Justice O'Connor dissented. 43
Since Justice Brennan's opinions in Price Waterhouse, Sheet
Metal Workers, and Paradise were all plurality opinions rather than
opinions of a majority of the Court, Justice O'Connor can be expected
to reassert the positions she set forth in her opinions in those cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor clearly regards the lawfulness of affirmative ac-
tion as more circumscribed than Justice Brennan did. However, she has
37 Id. at 196.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 197.
40 Id. at 198-99.
41 Id. at 199.
42 Id.
4" Id. at 199-200.
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supported race and sex goals which benefit non-victims of discrimina-
tion and she does not require findings that the discrimination being
remedied was committed by the employers or unions taking the affirm-
ative action.
While she probably will require that recidivists such as the Sheet
Metal Workers and the Alabama Department of Public Safety be
treated with more care than Justice Brennan required, she seems ulti-
mately prepared to support what truly needs to be done to end discrim-
ination, whether that be fines, flexible goals, or other measures.
So affirmative action not only is alive in the Supreme Court, but
seems likely to remain in that condition, even though it faces a stunted
existence. Moreover, legislation limiting affirmative action, such as the
Dole-Canady bill, seems unlikely to pass both houses in its present
form, much less override a presidential veto.
In this situation President Clinton has proposed that we mend af-
firmative action, rather than end it. That seems to me to be a good
idea, but I would go further than just insisting that unqualified workers
not be promoted, that white males not be excluded from consideration
when that is feasible, and that race and sex not be used to maintain
parity once it is achieved.
Let me suggest three additional possibilities:
The interests of non-minorities are obviously more impacted by
preferences that cause them to be laid off than by those that deny them
hiring opportunities. Promotional opportunities are more difficult to
categorize. Some, such as the position at stake in Johnson, may soon be
followed by other openings for which those denied the earlier opportu-
nity can compete." Others may be more one of a kind and the heir
apparent may have been identified some time ago. Also, the differences
among candidates may range from marginal to "head and shoulders."
Prudence, as well as fairness, suggests that strong expectations or sub-
stantial superiority should generally not be overridden by affirmative
action goals in making promotional decisions.
Some set asides may be required by the nature of the selection
process; for example, in Weber, selections were controlled by seniority
except for affirmative action concerns. However, where subjective judg-
ments are being made, exclusion of white males from consideration for
any vacancies may be considered too quota-like even if an employer is
not on pace to meet his goals. An alternative approach worth consider-
ing is to provide in such cases that white males may be selected only
after a reviewing official is satisfied that good faith efforts have been
taken to recruit and consider minorities and women.
Interim goals beyond availability make sense when the number of
openings is small and the imbalance is great. In deciding how much of
44 480 U.S. 616 at 638.
[Vol. 22:255 1996
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a multiplier to apply in such situations, consideration should be given
not only to the ability to find the numbers of qualified minorities and
women needed, but also to the extent that opportunities for white males
are being compressed. Obviously the compression is greater when an
employer has both minority and female goals than when it has only one
of those goals.
Actions such as these may help to avoid certain aspects of affirma-
tive action that some have criticized. I hope they will contribute to the
continuation of this process.
In my opinion affirmative action has contributed greatly to our
progress as a nation in increasing the utilization of minorities and
women. It has done so without undue trammeling on the interests of
white males, without requiring employers and unions to change their
selection procedures, and without requiring the use of significant gov-
ernmental resources.
It seems ironic that a Congress intent on reducing the size of gov-
ernment and eliminating or changing things that are not functional,
should be trying to dismantle something that is as effective as affirma-
tive action has been.
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